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Abstract 
A sound corporate governance mechanism is associated with significant and positive effect on firm’s value, 
increasing productivity and earnings, decreasing systematic risks and easier access to capital. This paper aims to 
examine the difference in quality of firm level governance characteristics and its impact on firm performance for 
companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange during the years from 2010 to 2013. Empirical analysis was made 
between firm’s value as measured by Tobins Q and Corporate Governance characteristics: Board Size, Board 
Members, CEO Duality and Audit Committee independence. The results indicate that there is a relationship 
between corporate governance attributes and firm performance in Pakistan. Members on the Board can add to 
companies’ activities by ensuring proper implementation of policies. We found positive significant relationship 
between Audit Committee Independence and firm performance. CEO duality does affect firm performance but its 
value is not significant. We could not find significant relationship between board independence and firm 
performance. Presence of female directors and family directors on the board affects firm performance negatively. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, Tobins Q, Pakistan, Female Director 
 
1. Introduction 
Sound corporate governance mechanisms help a company in acquisition of capital both from individual and 
institutional investors. Various studies relate the positive and significant effect of effective corporate governance 
to the firms’ values, their productivity and decreasing systematic risk. Especially for the emerging economies, 
good corporate governance environment serves as tool for the government to achieve many public policy goals. 
For example first, a good corporate governance environment ensures smooth flow of information to stake holders. 
This smother information flow decreases the probability of financial crisis and results in stability in the economy. 
Secondly, absence of well-developed corporate governance structure increase information acquisition cost and 
consequently translates into higher cost of capital. On the contrary, sound corporate governance structure improve 
disclosure environment that reduces information acquisition cost for investors resulting in lower cost of capital 
and capital market development. 
One of the most important aspects of corporate governance is the board directors. It consists of group of 
people who are assigned the duty to take long term decisions about the future of the company. Board of directors 
is responsible for policy decisions, strategic planning and monitoring of managerial actions for achievement of 
overall objectives of the firm. This power held by the board, highlights the importance of understanding how 
decisions are made at the board level and whether board characteristics play a role in decision making for 
achievement of objectives of the firm. In recent years, the discussion has focused on the characteristics and 
structure of the board of directors, the most important governance mechanism of the internal control systems 
(Jensen, 1993). 
After the major corporate collapses in the United States, regulators have felt the need to strengthen the 
corporate governance environment and have introduced Sarbanes Oxley Act in the year 2002. In the wave of this 
trembling international financial and economic scenario and introduction of new laws and regulation in order to 
improve corporate governance system, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) introduced 
Corporate Governance Code in 2002 and issued a revised version in 2012. Both corporate governance codes 
encourage the membership of non-executive and independent directors on the board. Introduction of these codes 
of corporate governance has attracted interest of many researchers to directors’ characteristics, corporate 
governance mechanisms and their effect on the overall firm performance. 
It is also a well-known fact that whenever regulatory authorities take some measures to restrict a behavior 
of individual, then opposite parties also find some loop holes in the laws and regulation in order to continue their 
previous practices, such as Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested inclusion of more independent directors on the 
board in order to improve governance in the firm. In order to counter that, some Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
who are dominant and have more influence over recruitment division of the company, then mostly appoint the 
directors who in past and present are working in line with the interest of CEOs in other firms (Zajac and Westphal, 
1996). Other Chief executive officer can try different techniques like appointing a director who is well known to 
them and has some liked interest with them. This kind of behavior undermines the quality of corporate governance 
as it damages quality of directors selection processes (Kuhnen, 2009), decisions relating to appointment and firing 
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of CEO  and financial decisions (Güner et al., 2008). 
Talking at broad level, corporate governance indicates composition of all institution surrounding the 
business environment in the country, including the legal institutions, regulatory authorities, financial and capital 
markets and the enforcement mechanisms of these institutions. The basic premise for the need for effective 
corporate governance lies in the assumption that interests and objectives of managers (insiders) and external 
shareholders are not  similar Berle and Gardiner (1968) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
This study is aimed at finding out the role played by corporate governance in determining the firm value 
for sample companies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). Most of the company’s ownership structure in 
Pakistan is highly concentrated as many companies are owned by influential families. This can be observed from 
the study of Javid and Iqbal (2010) in which they conducted an analysis of ownership concentration of fifty random 
companies from 2003 to 2007; they found that average percentage of ownership by top three and top five 
shareholders is more than 50%. So, the corporate governance problem in Pakistan is between majority and minority 
shareholders. The basic methods to resolve the conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders are 
legal framework which guards rights of minority shareholders, active corporate governance board members which 
continuously keep an eye on management’s action and well-functioning of markets to adjust the irregularities in 
the market. On the contrary to well developed economies, usually in under developed or in emerging economies, 
control and efficiency of market relies in the hands of majority and controlling shareholders (such as family) and 
institutional investors rather than depending on capital market and external shareholders. In this kind of situation, 
external (minority) investors are always at the risk of being expropriated by majority shareholders. 
Majority of the companies in Pakistan are controlled by business groups, government and affiliates of 
multinational companies. Business groups usually consists of apparently independents companies which are 
governed by a family holding majority of shares. Key positions in the management structure are filled by the 
choice of those controlling family and usually they appoint one of immediate or distant members of family. In this 
way, family controls all the business entities in group, (Gani and Ashraf, 2005). 
In Pakistan, pyramids ownership structures are also prominent. The corporate structure of Pakistan is 
mainly composed of concentrated family ownership, cross shareholdings, interlocking directorships and pyramid 
structure. This kind of ownership structure enables families to control many companies even with smaller cash 
flow rights. The companies which are controlled by families, affiliates of multinational firms and government 
usually are pledged with less objectivity in financial statements and undermined corporate governance system 
(Gani and Ashraf, 2005). As a result, investor usually discount the value of those firms with higher rates 
considering the fact that controlling owners are at ease to exploit the rights of minority shareholders.  
The corporate governance mechanism has also become an area of interest in the field of corporate and 
business research. A positive growing corporate governance behavior in firms can play an important role in 
attracting foreign direct investment and mobilizing greater saving towards capital market. The corporate 
governance policies in Pakistan is based upon two factors; protection of minority shareholders and profit 
maximization incentives for family controllers. Some areas related to corporate governance and its effect on firm 
valuation are yet to be discovered. This study is an attempt to make contribution towards literature and finding the 
effects of corporate governance on firm valuation in Pakistan. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and 
presents the hypotheses of our paper. Research methodology is discussed in section 3, while empirical results are 
presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper and provides directions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 Corporate governance and firm value  
A lot of research work is being carried on the impact of corporate governance on business performance of firms 
for developed economies. There have been many studies conducted to test the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm value. Many empirical studies focus on the impact of various corporate governance policies 
in cross section of countries. Some of prominent studies include work by Mitton (2002) with the sample of 398 
firms from Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand and the results indicate that differences in firm’s 
corporate governance has significant impact on East Asian firms during crises of 1997-1998. The results suggest 
that firms with better stock performance have higher outside ownership concentration, higher disclosure quality 
and are focused rather than diversified firms.  The studies of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), John and Senbet (1998), 
Adams et al. (2008) provide us with good literature review, making it an important field of research specially in 
developing economies.  
Much of empirical work for finding the relationship between corporate governance and firm value is 
based on single jurisdiction.  Brown and Caylor (2004) measure the broad corporate governance Gov-score with 
51 factors, 8 sub-categories for 2327 US firms based on the dataset of Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS). The 
result indicates that firms with better governance are relatively more profitable and distribute more dividends 
among shareholders. Gompers et al. (2001) use data from Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) and 
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found that firms with less shareholder rights have lower valuation and stock returns. They grouped 24 governance 
factors into different groups: voting rights, director protection, state laws, delaying hostile takeover and other 
takeover defenses. The finding reveals that firms with stronger shareholder rights have higher profits, higher firm 
values, higher sales growth, lower cost of capital and rare corporate acquisition.  
Ammann et al. (2011) in their study using large sample of 22 developed countries for the years fro, 2003 
to 2007 found that there is positive significant impact on firm value and relation also remains the same even when 
they used alternative measure of corporate governance in order to consider the value relevance of corporate 
governance attributes. Gupta and Sharma (2014) conducted their study on two prominent countries of Asia namely 
India and South Korea using sample of five top companies from each country for the period of 2005-06 to 2012-
13 and found that corporate governance of company only defines a small proportion of firm performance, therefore 
other factors affecting corporate governance should be considered as well while conducting research on firm 
performance. Balasubramanian et al. (2010) in their study on Indian public companies using survey method with 
sample of 318 firms found that corporate governance has statistically significant positive impact on firm value. 
They also found that strength of this relationship is dependent on profitability and growth opportunity held by the 
firm. More the growth opportunities and profitability, stronger will be the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm value. Corporate governance is important factor to improve decision making process as good 
corporate governance smooth the information flow, making financial statements more transparent and improving 
quality of investment decisions which ultimately improves the value of the firms. Good corporate governance can 
also force the internal management and controlling shareholders to work in the interest of all, rather than working 
only in their own interest (Andreou et al., 2014). Furthermore, Sami et al. (2011) using the composite measure of 
corporate governance on sample of Chinese listed companies confirmed that better corporate governance is 
positively related to performance and valuation for the firms in China.  
 
2.2 Board size 
There is mixed evidence in the literature on the relationship between board size and firm value. Some studies show 
that limiting board size improves performance because there are communication gaps and problems regarding 
decision making processes in larger boards. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993). However, Yermack 
(1996) gave inverse relationship between smaller board size and profitability. Anderson et al. (2004) shows that 
cost of capital is lower for larger boards and creditors view the enterprises as having more effective monitoring of 
financial statements. Brown and Caylor (2004) find that firms between 6 and 15 board members have higher profit 
margin and return on equity. According to recourse dependence theory, larger boards that has connections to 
external environment increases the ability of organization to access more recourses and this results in capturing 
more growth opportunities and ultimately enhances organization’s performance. In line with resource dependency 
theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that organizations which requires more external links for better 
performance, board size of those organizations should be bigger. Further, Van et al. (2004) argued that as compared 
to smaller board size, increasing the members of governing board brought more diversity, ideas, intellect and 
experiences in corporate decision making process. Corporate governance board is backbone of a firm because 
members of that board are responsible for and in charge of all the decision making of the firm. Therefore, a well-
functioning board is very much important for survival and success of organization. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
suggest that bigger board size is harmful for the company’s performance because it creates opportunities for some 
of the board members to take credit of the efforts actually put by others. Given the mixed arguments and empirical 
findings, we hypothesize that; 
H1: There is a significant relation between board size and performance of listed firms in Pakistan. 
 
2.3 Characteristics of Board members 
The main role of external directors (independent and non-executive directors) is to contribute objectively in 
decision making of firm and independently evaluate the company’s performance. On the other hand, executive 
directors (insiders) are directly involved in the operations of company therefore they have greater and firsthand 
information as compared to outsiders. Previous literature exhibits the mixed results about the outside directors 
such as Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990) found that relationship between adding outside (independent and non-
executive) directors on corporate value is direct and significant with share price. On the contrary Ehikioya (2009) 
found that outside directors on a board has a negative influence on firm performance as measured by return on 
assets and price-earnings ratio. On the other hand Mashayekhi & Bazaz (2008) and Jackling & Johl (2009) 
discovered that having outside (independent and non-executive) directors on board has direct relationship with 
organization performance. 
Fosberg (1989) find no significant relation between the proportion of outside directors and performance 
of firms. On the other hand Baysinger and Butler (1985), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) show that firms get 
marketing rewards for appointing outside directors. Brickley et al. (1994) find a positive relation between the 
proportion of outside directors and stock market reactions. Anderson et al. (2004) show that cost of debt and board 
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independence is inversely related to each other. Studies based on financial statements and Tobin’s Q find no 
relation between firms performance and board independence, however studies find a positive relation by using 
stock returns data. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) , Brown and Caylor (2004), Bhagat and Black (2001), were 
unable to find Tobin’s Q to increase in board independence. However they show that firms with independent 
directors have higher profit margins, higher return on equity, higher stock purchases and higher dividend yield, 
suggesting that board independence do affect firm performance. Based on literature available we hypothesize that: 
H2A: There is a significant positive relationship between proportion of external (independent and non-executive) 
directors on board and performance of listed firms in Pakistan. 
In Pakistan, ownership is highly concentrated and is characterized by influential family ownership and several key 
management positions are also filled by the family members. Family firms have also pyramid structure ownership 
in the form of business groups. Like other Asian markets, agency problem exists between majority and minority 
shareholders. Wiwattanakantang (2001) analyzed the data of 270 non-financial listed firms in Thailand. He found 
that ownership concentration is positively associated with accounting-based measures of performance (i.e. return 
on assets and sales-assets ratio). Moreover, he observed that family-controlled and foreign-controlled firms as well 
as firms with more than one controlling shareholders have higher return on assets relative to firms with no 
controlling shareholders. Anderson and Reeb (2003) argued that family ownership in listed firms operating in well-
regulated and transparent markets reduces agency costs. On the other hand, (Faccio et al., 2001)) claim that 
politically powerful families in control of public firms have been able to expropriate minority shareholders in East 
Asia where transparency is low. Given the mixed empirical findings, we hypothesize that; 
H2B:   There is a significant relationship between proportion of family directors on the board and firm 
performance in Pakistan. 
Furthermore, research suggests that diversity is increasing especially by gender. For example, Daily et al. (1999) 
in his study on Fortune 500 firms, indicates that women have made significant progress in terms of assuming seats 
on boards of directors, but not in terms of taking CEO positions. Bilimoria (2000) reports that even though the 
number of female board members is increasing slightly, few companies actively recruit females and there is still 
gender bias, stereotyping and tokenism on boards where women serve. Mattis (2000) concludes that women board 
members are increasing in numbers but the changes are small and incremental. In addition, Smith et al. (2006) 
intricate that woman director may better understand particular market conditions than men, which may bring more 
creativity and quality to board decision-making. They also argue that a more gender diverse board may generate a 
better public image of the firm and, through this, improve firm performance. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2C:    There is a significant positive relationship between proportion of female directors on the board and firm 
performance in Pakistan.  
 
2.4 CEO duality 
Commonly, CEO Duality is referred to a situation when a single person holds the two top positions in company’s 
management, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and chairman of the board. The position of CEO and chairman do 
show effect on firm performance. Yermack (1996) finds that firms are more valuable and well performed when 
these two positions are separate. Brown and Ceylor (2004) shows that firms with separate CEO and board chairman 
position are more valuable. One of the famous management theories, named agency theory says that CEO duality 
is harmful for proper working of the governance board because it reduces impartiality and adversely effects the 
independent evaluation of board on management’s actions. Fama and Jensen (1983) explained that CEO and 
Chairman Positions should not be held by a single person because holding two top positions by single person 
makes him/her dominate over all other members of board and adversely effects proper monitoring role of board 
of managerial activities. Contrastingly, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggested that leaders having more power are 
relatively at better position to implement the long term decisions and can also manage the resistance that arises in 
response of a new policy or decisions in a better way. In view of Brickley et al. (1997) there is no fixed form of 
leadership because every leadership structure has its pros and cons. For example, Abor and Biekpe (2007) using 
sample of SMEs of Ghana found that CEO Duality contributes positively towards firm performance. On other 
hand, Ehikioya (2009) concluded that CEO and chairman position held by a single person adversely affect firm 
performance. Therefore, both roles should be separated. Based on the previous research we hypothesize that: 
H3:    There is a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in Pakistan. 
 
2.5 Audit committee Independence  
Audit committee in any given company is considered an internal supervising system, which can monitor the 
activities of the management so that management can act in the best interests of shareholders and achieve the 
objective of shareholders’ value maximization. The main purpose of Audit committee (AC) of company is to 
“enhance the reliability of information provided in the financial statements by the company to stake holders and 
spreading impartiality in firm’s affairs (Bradbury, 1990). Audit committee of company has also been defined as 
agents of shareholders who keep checks and balances on managements activities so that management work for 
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welfare of the shareholders over time (Harrison, 1987, English, 1994, Menon and Williams, 1994, Mitton, 2002, 
Gendron and Bédard, 2006). The results on relation between audit-related governance and firm performance are 
mixed. Brown and Ceylor (2004) find that independent audit committee have positive relation to dividend yield 
but don’t have significant effect on operating performance and firm valuation. Klein (2002) shows a negative 
relation between earning management and audit committee independence. Anderson et al. (2004) finds that 
independent audit committee results in lower debt financing cost. Frankel et al. (2002) gives a negative relation 
between auditor independence and earning management, based on audit fee.  On the basis of this we hypothesize 
that:    
H4:    There is a significant positive relationship between Audit committee independence and firm performance in 
Pakistan. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample contains data of all non-financial companies listed on Karachi stock exchange (KSE)-100 indexes in 
Pakistan for the period of 2010 to 2013. Karachi stock exchange (KSE) is the largest stock exchange of Pakistan. 
Index that is used on Karachi stock exchanges is named as KSE-100 index.  As described by official website of 
Karachi exchange of Pakistan (KSE), KSE-100 Index was constructed in November 1991 with base value of 1000 
points. 100 in that index refer to the 100 top companies in corporate sector. This index includes top hundred 
companies and basis for choosing those companies is sector representation and highest market capitalization. The 
data was obtained from BVD OSIRIS data base and annual reports of the firms listed on KSE 100 Index. We 
exclude the financial firms and firms with missing data resulting in 196 firm year observations for 49 companies. 
Those selected companies cover more than 90% of whole the capitalization of the firms listed on Exchange. 
 
3.2 Variables Definitions  
The proxies that are used to measure the corporate governance include Non-Executive Directors (NEX), CEO 
Duality (CEOD), Board Size (Bsize), Audit Committee Independence (ACI), Family Directors (FAMD) and 
Female Directors (female director). Detail of all the variables is gives in following table. 
Table 1 Definition of Variables 
Dependent Variable  
Tobin’s Q We use the natural logarithm of the ratio of the market value of assets 
to book value to proxy for Tobin’s Q. The book value of assets is total 
assets. The market value of assets is total assets plus the market value 
of equity minus the book value of equity. The market value of equity 
is the stock price at the end of the fiscal year time’s common shares 
outstanding. 
Explanatory variables  
Non-Executive Directors 
 (NEX) 
Log of the number of Non-Executive directors on the board.  
CEO Duality  
(CEOD) 
Dummy variable: One if chairman and CEO post are held by single 
person otherwise zero. 
Board Size  
(Bsize) 
Log of firms board size. Board size is defined as total number of 
directors on firm’s board. 
Audit Committee Independence (ACI) Dummy variable: One if chairman of the audit committee is not from 
family or an executive director otherwise zero. 
Family Directors  
(FAMD) 
Log of the number of family directors on the board. 
Female Directors 
(femaledirector) 
 
Log of the number of female directors on the board. 
Control Variables  
AGE  Log of age of firm: age of firm is defined as total number of years 
firm is in business since date of incorporation. 
CFO Log of operating cash flows of the firm.  
SIZE Log of total assets. 
 
3.3 Regression Model  
We used panel data methodology because the sample contained data across firms and over time. Moreover, panel 
data sets are better able to identify and estimate effects that simply are not detectable in pure cross-sectional or 
pure time-series data. Ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the relationship between the internal 
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attributes of corporate governance and the measure of firm performance. Specifically, we estimate the following 
regression model; 
 
Where TobinsQit is the TobinsQ of ith firm in time t, EXit is the Non-Executive directors of ith firm in 
time t, CEODit is the CEO duality of ith firm in time t Bsizeit is the board size of ith firm in time t, ACIit is Audit 
committee independence of ith firm in time t, FAMDit is family directors of ith firm in time t, femaledirectorit   is 
the female directors of ith firm in time t is the intercept and  is the random error term for the ith firm in time 
t. 
 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the all regression variables in the study. Average number of members 
on the board is between 8 and 9. Minimum size of board is 6 whereas maximum is 15. Average number of non-
executive directors on the board is 5. Interestingly, overall number of non-executive directors on the board is more 
than the executive directors. In total, percentage of non-executive directors on the board is around 60%. Minimum 
number of non-executive on the board is 1 whereas maximum number is 13. In 20% of companies in the sample, 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the chairman. In only 25% of companies in the sample, chairman of the 
audit committee is a non-family member or a non-executive director. Average size of companies in the sample is 
around 23. Minimum size of company is sample is 20.45 whereas maximum size is 26.74. Average number of 
family directors on corporate boards is around two. Maximum number of family directors on corporate board is 7 
and minimum number is zero. A female director representations on the board is very low, less than 10 percent 
companies in the sample is having female directors on the board. Maximum number of female directors on the 
board is 2 and minimum number of female directors on the board is zero. Average age of the companies in sample 
is around 38 years. This indicates that all the companies in sample are well established and are in the maturity 
stage of the business cycle. Minimum value of CFO is negative which shows that firms have more cash outflows 
than inflows.  
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for the variables. It can be observed from the table that board 
independence measure that is the number of non-executive directors on the board (NEX) has positive correlation 
with Tobins Q, which implies that more the board will be independent better will be the performance of the 
company. As for company leadership, it can be seen that CEO Duality (CEOD) is negatively correlated with Tobins 
Q which implies that CEO Duality causes accumulation of power and adversely affects independent evaluation on 
the corporate Board. CEO Duality (CEOD) is also negatively correlated with number of non-executive directors 
on the board (NEX). This refers that if in any company the posts of CEO and chairman post are held by single 
person, then that CEO hinders the inclusion of non-executive directors on the board which ultimately negatively 
affects the independence of the board of the company. Board size is positively correlated with Tobins Q and it 
indicates that, overall more members on the board bring diversity, ideas, intellect and experiences in corporate 
decision making process. Board size is also positively correlated with number of non-executive directors on the 
board, this implies that larger the board more it will help in building impartiality and independence on the 
governance board. Audit committee independence (ACI) is also positively correlated with Tobins Q; this indicate 
that greater independence of audit committee will contribute to performance of the firm. Family directors (FAMD) 
are negatively correlated with Tobins Q and it refers that more family directors on the board will affects 
independent monitoring of the board and therefore will adversely impact firm’s performance. Family directors 
(FAMD) are also negatively correlated with non-executive directors (NEX) on the board which refers that in order 
to gain more control on the board, family directors hinders the inclusion of non-executive directors on the board. 
Female directors on the board (female directors) are negatively correlated to Tobins Q too. The main reason behind 
this type of correlation is that most of the female directors on the board are very closely related to CEO (Chief 
Executive Officer), Chairman or controlling family.  
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max 
TobinsQ 196.000 3.386 0.986 19.940 0.239 246.952 
NEX 196.000 5.107 5.000 2.283 1.000 13.000 
CEOD 196.000 0.204 0.000 0.404 0.000 1.000 
Bsize 196.000 8.561 8.000 1.820 6.000 15.000 
ACI 196.000 0.255 0.000 0.437 0.000 1.000 
FAMD 196.000 1.954 2.000 1.852 0.000 7.000 
femaledirector 192.000 0.323 0.000 0.639 0.000 2.000 
CFO 196.000 3.93 4.94 1.640 -6.89 1.86 
AGE 196.000 38.194 43.000 17.791 6.000 66.000 
SIZE 196.000 23.114 22.993 1.360 20.452 26.749 
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TobinsQ is natural logarithm of the ratio of the market value of assets to book value to proxy for Tobbin’sQ. The 
book value of assets is total assets. The market value of assets is total assets plus the market value of equity minus 
the book value of equity. The market value of equity is the stock price at the end of the fiscal year time’s common 
shares outstanding. NEX Log of Non-Executive directors on the board, CEOD Dummy variable: One if chairman 
and CEO post are held by single person otherwise zero. Bsize is Log of firm’s board size. Board size is defined as 
total number of directors on firm’s board. ACI is Dummy variable: One if chairman of audit committee is not from 
family or executive director otherwise zero. FAMDI Log of family directors of board size. femaledirector is Log 
Number of female directors on the board. CFO is Log of operating cash flows of the firm. AGE is Log of age of 
firm: age of firm is defined as total number of years firm is in business since date of incorporation. SIZE is Log of 
total assets. 
Therefore, inclusion of female directors that are closely linked with controlling owners also influence 
adversely on independent monitoring capability of board of the firm. 
TABLE 3 CORRELATION MATRIX  
TobinsQ is natural logarithm of the ratio of the market value of assets to book value to proxy for Tobbin’sQ. The 
book value of assets is total assets. The market value of assets is total assets plus the market value of equity minus 
the book value of equity. The market value of equity is the stock price at the end of the fiscal year time’s common 
shares outstanding. NEX Log of Non-Executive directors on the board, CEOD Dummy variable: One if chairman 
and CEO post are held by single person otherwise zero. Bsize is Log of firm’s board size. Board size is defined as 
total number of directors on firm’s board. ACI is Dummy variable: One if chairman of audit committee is not from 
family or executive director otherwise zero. FAMDI Log of family directors of board size. Femaledirector is Log 
Number of female directors on the board. CFO is Log of operating cash flows of the firm. AGE is Log of age of 
firm: age of firm is defined as total number of years firm is in business since date of incorporation. SIZE is Log of 
total assets. 
For the control variables, age is negatively correlated with firms Tobins Q, as our sample includes quite 
mature companies therefore, it indicates that with time as firm moves towards maturity stage its opportunities for 
growth decreases and performance also decreases with age. Furthermore, operating cash flows (CFO) is negatively 
correlated with Tobins Q. Main reason behind this is that Tobins Q is market measure of performance so many 
other things (shareholders expectation about future performance, economic environment etc.) also affect it in 
combination of (CFO). Size is also positively correlated to Tobins Q, this refers that larger companies got more 
recourses therefore they can avail more opportunities as compared to smaller companies and this can improve 
company’s performance. 
Table 4 Regression results for corporate governance and firm performance   
TobinsQ Coefficient t-statistic  
Cons -13.83*** -2.87  
Independent variable    
NEX 0.58 1.68  
CEOD 0.56 1.05  
Bsize 4.10*** 3.52  
ACI 0.66** 2.28  
FAMD -1.1** -2.27  
femaledirector -0.31 -1.668  
Control Variables    
CFO -0.0002** -2.60  
AGE -0.0001 0.02  
SIZE 0.67*** 3.34  
Adj-R2 0.3840   
F-value 28.230***   
TobinsQ is natural logarithm of the ratio of the market value of assets to book value to proxy for Tobbin’sQ. The 
book value of assets is total assets. The market value of assets is total assets plus the market value of equity minus 
the book value of equity. The market value of equity is the stock price at the end of the fiscal year time’s common 
 TobinsQ NEX CEOD Bsize ACI FAMD Femaledirector CFO AGE SIZE 
TobinsQ 1.000          
NEX 0.204 1.000         
CEOD -0.115 -0.386 1.000        
Bsize 0.118 0.144 -0.009 1.000       
ACI 0.121 0.003 0.127 0.265 1.000      
FAMD -0.183 -0.067 -0.079 0.147 0.571 1.000     
Femaledirector -0.082 -0.372 0.156 0.131 0.358 0.287 1.000    
CFO -0.127 -0.123 -0.104 -0.223 -0.027 0.060 -0.115 1.000   
AGE -0.055 0.127 0.258 -0.057 -0.255 -0.466 -0.109 -0.316 1.000  
SIZE 0.012 -0.075 -0.043 -0.829 -0.315 -0.178 -0.153 0.331 0.041 1.000 
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shares outstanding. NEX Log of Non-Executive directors on the board, CEOD Dummy variable: One if chairman 
and CEO post are held by single person otherwise zero. Bsize is Log of firm’s board size. Board size is defined as 
total number of directors on firm’s board. ACI is Dummy variable: One if chairman of audit committee is not from 
family or executive director otherwise zero. FAMDI Log of family directors of board size. Femaledirector is Log 
Number of female directors on the board. CFO is Log of operating cash flows of the firm. AGE is Log of age of 
firm: age of firm is defined as total number of years firm is in business since date of incorporation. SIZE is Log of 
total assets. 
Table 4 contains Ordinary Least Square (OLS) results of regression for Tobins Q and corporate 
governance variables. Model has passed F-test and adjusted R2 is 38%. It can be observed from the results that the 
measure of number of independent directors on the board (NEX) is not significant but its coefficient shows the 
positive association with Tobins Q in line with hypothesis 2A.  
Secondly, Pakistan is one of those economies that have weak law enforcement. Previous research also 
provides evidence that Pakistan lies in the cluster of the insider economies with high concentration, weak investor 
protection and low enforcement. (Leuz et al., 2003). And also the Coefficient of the (NEX) is very small which 
indicates that independence of the board does not contribute too much to firm’s performance. Our results are 
consistent with Fracassi and Tate (2012) who also found similar kind of relationship between board independence 
and firm value. Measure of leadership in the firm, CEO Duality (CEOD) coefficient sign is in line with Hypothesis 
3 but its value is not significant. This result is in line with many studies like Elsayed (2007) and Mashayekhi and 
Bazaz (2008).  As Elsayed (2007) argued that, CEO Duality (CEOD) may only be significant and positive when 
performance of the company is very low. Our sample consist of all well established and well performing companies 
on KSE-100 index, therefore the coefficient of CEO Duality (CEOD) is not significant. Board size is positive and 
highly significant, almost at 1% and also the coefficient of Board size (Bsize) is highest among the all other 
measure of corporate governance. This is completely in line with our Hypothesis 1.  This implies that greater board 
size will result in more diversity, experience, intellect and better quality of monitoring on the board which will 
positively impact firm’s performance. Our results are consistent with many prior studies like Van den Berghe and 
Levrau (2004), Andersonet, Mansi and Reeb, 2004), Jackling and Johl, (2009) and Ehikioya, (2009) etc. 
Coefficient of measure of Audit committee independence (ACI) is also completely in line with our Hypothesis 4.  
This implies that independence of Audit Committee smooth flow of information among all the channels of 
company, increases credibility of information of the company, keeps proper check and balance on management of 
the company, decreases probability of frauds and increases quality of disclosures. These all things create good 
image of the company in the mind of investors and increases firm value for investors of the firm. This result is 
indicated in many previous researches like Eichenseher and Shields (1985),  DeZoort (1998),  Carcello and Neal 
(2003), Harrison (1987), English (1994), Menon and Williams (1994), DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and 
Reed (2002) and Gendron and Bédard (2006). Additionally, Coefficient of family directors on the board (FAMD) 
is negative and significant at 1%. This is also in line with our Hypothesis 2B. This indicates that family directors 
on the board play expropriating role and undermine the interest of minority shareholders. Family directors on 
corporate board also impacts impartial monitoring of the board and send negative signal in the minds of investors 
that family is having full control on company and minority shareholders interest will be at risk in that company . 
This results in adverse impact on firm’s performance. Having family directors on the board also signifies the 
control of family in company and many studies have found negative relationship of family control and firm value 
like Faccio et al. (2001). Measure for female directors (female director) on the board is also not significant. Results 
are different from what we had predicted in the Hypothesis 2C. There might be several factors for explaining the 
results, for example there are only few companies in the sample which have female representation on the board. 
Its coefficient has also negative sign, because most of the female directors on the boards of companies in the 
sample are either relatives of CEO (Chief Executive Officer) and chairman or they have other social connections 
based on different activities. Therefore such kind of female directors also undermine the quality of board 
performance. Moreover, Pakistan cultural factor can also be taken under consideration as Pakistan has male 
dominated society. For control variables, operating cash flows measure (CFO) has negative and significant 
coefficient, which is surprising. But main reason behind this is that Tobins Q is market measure of performance 
and there are lots of variable in external environment which can affect it (like state of country, investors’ 
expectations, political instability etc.). Pakistan during study years was also facing many problems like energy 
crisis, political instability, terrorism etc. This kind of situation created doubt in the minds of investors from 
investing in the companies that were having good cash flows and other performance measures. Age of firm has 
negative coefficient which implies that mature firms have lesser opportunities of growth and it hurt performance. 
Size has positive coefficient, this implies that bigger firms has more resources and expertise to avail opportunities 
than smaller firms.  
 
5. Conclusion and Findings  
Properly functioning corporate board is very much important for better performance of the company.  Members 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.7, 2016 
 
26 
on the Board can add to companies’ activities both by giving proper suggestions to managers and monitoring 
managerial actions and policies whether they are being implemented or already implemented in the company. 
Directors represent shareholders on the board therefore, a good director is one who impartially monitors the 
activities of the management and gives his independent opinion on the activities of management which will benefit 
the shareholders. Therefore, it is of quite significance to know about the factors that will impact directors’ 
capability and willingness to bring valuable information to company and to monitor in impartially. We found 
positive significant relationship between Audit Committee and firm performance and this result is consistent with 
recent research evidence like DeZoort et al. (2002) and Gendron and Bédard (2006). Furthermore, we found that 
adding female director on the board also negatively affects firm’ performance. The reason behind this is also social 
connections between female directors and chairman, CEO and controlling family because; most of the female 
directors in our sample are relatives either of CEO or controlling family. We could not find significant relationship 
between independence on the board and firm performance. As explained by recent evidence like Fracassi and Tate 
(2012) board independence has little impact on firm’s performance that can be reason for its insignificant 
coefficient.  In this study, sample of Pakistani companies is used because it has issued Code of Corporate 
Governance recently and there has been little known about gaps in that code. Those gaps can be exploited by some 
members of corporate sectors. So this study sheds some lights on the gaps in the code like, it does not specify 
clearly the characteristics of external directors to be appointed on the board and in result of that either management 
or controlling shareholders take advantage of that gap by appointing socially connected directors. For the sake of 
making Corporate Governance Code more effective, this study also helps the regulators in identifying the gaps 
available in current code especially in the field of external directors’ role and responsibilities. The results of this 
study also helps the investors by providing new perspective of checking the independence of the governance board 
of the company and helps them in better evaluation of the company. Finally, this study has potential implications 
for relevant countries which have similarities in legal framework and corporate environment. The future research 
could be directed towards examining the social connections between controlling owners and directors and how 
these social connections undermine effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
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